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“. . . Speak Now or Forever Hold Your Peace . . .” 
—The Influence of Constitutional Argument on 
Same-Sex Marriage Legislation Debates in Australia 
Neville Rochow* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The bankruptcy of courtesy and respect in Australian public 
discourse represents one of the major inhibitors of free speech.1 This 
has been particularly noticeable in recent debates regarding same-sex 
marriage. Accuracy was the first casualty, and the character of the 
opponent followed closely behind. Anticipation of public personal 
attacks by opponents discouraged some with strongly held values 
from speaking up publicly. Debate was thus less informed and less 
balanced. This lack of courtesy and respect stands in stark contrast 
with the best traditions and practices of institutional debate, such as 
those found in the courts and legislatures. A mechanism had to be 
found to bring the debate back from the brink of total abandonment 
of rational, respectful debate. The presentation of constitutional 
argument appears, in some measure, to have done that. 
Correctly functioning, the adversarial systems manifested in both 
legal and parliamentary procedure, inherited from Britain, have 
proven in Australia to be effective means for weighing alternatives 
and giving opposing views equal opportunity to persuade. The 
 
 * SC, LLB (Hons), LLM (Adelaide), LLM (Deakin), Barrister. This article seeks to 
present the position as at March 2013. The writer is indebted to his colleague at the South 
Australian Bar, Christopher Brohier, who made significant contributions to the submissions we 
made together before parliamentary committees and to legislators. 
 1. Another potential inhibitor to free speech is anti-discrimination legislation, as 
exemplified in the now withdrawn federal Human Rights and Anti-Discrimination Bill 2012 
currently under committee review. There were fundamental questions as to its constitutional 
validity and clarity of drafting, as well as its departure from principles in relation to the standard 
of proof. See WILBERFORCE FOUND., SUBMISSION OF THE WILBERFORCE FOUNDATION TO THE 
SENATE INQUIRY IN RELATION TO THE HUMAN RIGHTS AND ANTI-DISCRIMINATION BILL 2012, 
(Dec. 21, 2012), 
http://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/Senate_Committees?url=legcon_
ctte/anti_discrimination_2012/report/e01.htm; see also Augusto Zimmerman, Religious 
Vilification Laws in Australia: Philosophical Underpinnings and Constitutional Implications, 2014 BYU L. 
REV. (forthcoming 2013). 
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dialectic of properly regulated debate exposes both strengths and 
weaknesses of competing cases to the arbiter so that a reasoned 
decision is more likely than might have been possible through 
unilateral inquiry into that same issue. 
Court processes, closely following English models, are, certainly 
in theory and largely in practice, respectful and courteous affairs. 
Between bar and bench, among the advocates appearing for the 
adversaries and in the examination of witnesses, communications in 
court, as a general rule order, are polite and respectful. This derives 
from long-held traditions and well-established rules as to court 
manner, content, and form. 
In theory, though perhaps less so in practice, the Westminster 
parliamentary system is also governed by traditions, rules, and 
procedures for the orderly presentation of both sides of a debate. The 
system is marked by a separation of the judicial arm of government 
from the legislative and executive arms. However, the executive arm 
is kept in check by the legislature through the principle of 
“responsible government.”2 
The concept of “responsible government” provides that the 
executive, represented through members who are also Ministers of 
 
 2. The concept of “responsible government” in a federal system, combining a governing 
lower house and a powerful elected Senate, was unique to Australia in 1901. The British 
Parliament had long practised this form of government, in a unitary system, with an appointed 
upper house, (the House of Lords), requiring Ministers of the Crown to be members of 
Parliament who were “responsible” to Parliament for their executive decisions and actions. The 
Ministers were permitted to govern only so long as the government had the confidence of the 
House–traditionally reflected in having a majority of members in the lower house. Once 
confidence was “lost,” Parliament would be prorogued by the monarch and a general election 
would be called. This was the system of parliamentary democracy with which the framers of the 
Australian federal constitution were most familiar. A deliberate decision was made during 
drafting to adopt and superimpose that system upon a federal structure rather than adopting a 
federal model such as that found in the United States and Switzerland. See Colin Howard & 
Cheryl Saunders, The Blocking of the Budget and Dismissal of the Government, in LABOR AND THE 
CONSTITUTION 1972–1975: ESSAYS AND COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONTROVERSIES 
OF THE WHITLAM YEARS IN AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT 251, 266, 274–79 (Gareth Evans ed. 1977); 
see also R. J. Ellicott, Commentaries, in LABOR AND THE CONSITITUTION 1972–1975: ESSAYS AND 
COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONTROVERSIES OF THE WHITLAM YEARS IN AUSTRALIAN 
GOVERNMENT 288 (quoting OWEN DIXON, JESTING PILATE 107 (1944)) (“We, under our 
conception of democracy, so far separating the executive and the legislature, insist on the 
dependence of Cabinet upon Parliament. We insist too that if a difficulty arises between the 
executive government and Parliament, it shall be resolved by an appeal to the people, and we 
place on the representative of the Sovereign the responsibility of saying whether the case is one 
for the dissolution of Parliament and general election. This we do because we have proudly 
preserved the monarchy at the apex of our constitutional system.”). 
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the Crown, responds and accounts to Parliament on the floor of 
Parliament, by honest and frank answers to questions posed by 
members of the legislature.3 In fact, one of the boasts of the 
Westminster system is holding the executive to account through 
“question time.”4 During question time, non-government ranks, 
particularly the opposition, are permitted to ask of members of 
Cabinet, representing the executive, questions on matters of 
governance and policy. Question time is at its finest when 
“questions on notice” are answered at Westminster.5 The questions 
are given some weeks in advance to the executive with respect to 
issues in a particular portfolio.6 Under current practices, each 
question is assigned a number and, when Parliament is in session to 
answer questions on notice, the members of the opposition stand 
and call out the assigned numbers in sequence. The relevantly 
responsible secretary then approaches the dispatch box and gives the 
answer. Debate is thus informed and orderly, allowing little need or 
opportunity for personal attack or insult in either the question or the 
answer. 
However, outside the courts and parliament, the tone of debate 
is quite different, particularly with respect to same-sex marriage. It is 
regrettable that the tenor of public discourse in Australia has 
degenerated into the ad hominem attack. Instead of dealing with 
issues, too often and too readily there is name calling. Opponents of 
same-sex marriage have had their views unfairly reported and 
inaccurately represented, and have been personally vilified and 
denigrated so readily that the debate has quickly become personal, 
shrill, and vicious. Points under debate and relevant facts become 
secondary. Too easily are labels like “bigot,” “fanatic,” “homophobe,” 
 
 3. The Governor-General, as the monarch’s representative, acts on the “advice” of 
Cabinet while it maintains confidence of the House. The constitutional conventions that define 
this relationship have come through British practices and procedures, modified over time to suit 
the federal structure. See H. V. EVATT & LESLIE ZINES, THE ROYAL PREROGATIVE (1987); see also 
AUSTRALIAN CONSTITUTION s 62, 64. 
 4. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES PRACTICE 543 (6th ed. 2012) 
available at http://www.aph.gov.au/~/media/05%20About%20Parliament/53%20HoR/ 
532%20PPP/Practice6/PDF/Chapters/6Chap15.ashx. 
 5. In Australia, question time is still embarrassingly marred by personal insult and 
invective on both sides of the chamber. See Peter Costello, Standard of Debate Nothing to Laugh 
About, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD (Sept. 12, 2012), http://www.smh.com.au/opinion/politics 
/standard-of-debate-nothing-to-laugh-about-20120911-25qet.html. 
 6. UK PARLIAMENT, http://www.parliament.uk/about/how/business/questions/ (last 
visited Aug. 9, 2013). 
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and “misogynist” employed to gain perceived forensic advantage when 
they serve no useful or proper purpose in the dialectic of informed 
argument.7 
How could both sides be heard fairly in this climate of verbal 
pugilism? Value-neutral arguments, based upon the constitution, 
were needed. Groups of lawyers concerned that the debate over the 
constitutionality of same-sex marriage legislation was being 
suppressed decided to focus on the legislation’s constitutional 
validity.8 Submissions made to legislatures opposing such legislative 
measures were careful to distinguish between the constitutional 
arguments and those based upon values. While constitutional 
argument has not muted all vitriolic attack, or guaranteed either 
accuracy or balance in reporting of the debate, it has provided a 
logical framework upon which debate can proceed. It has, at least,  
 
 
 7. See, e.g., Neville Rochow, Turning the Tide on Same-Sex Marriage, 33 AUSTL. FAMILY 5 
(2012) available at http://www.family.org.au/index.php/afa-journal/116-afa-journal-vol-33-no-3-
2012/204-turning-the-tide-on-same-sex-marriage-a-case-study-of-the-arguments-presented-in-
tasmania; Katherine Spackman, Abuse and Demonisation of Gay Marriage Opponents Must Stop, 
AUSTL. CHRISTIAN LOBBY (July 14, 2011), http://www.acl.org.au/2011/07/mr-abuse-and-
demonisation-of-gay-marriage-opponents-must-stop/; Heath Aston & Dan Harrison, Christian 
Groups Welcome Gay Marriage Referendum, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD (April 29, 2013), 
http://www.smh.com.au/opinion/political-news/christian-groups-welcome-gay-marriage-
referendum-20130429-2io0q.html; Peter Wicks, To the Extreme with “Hard” Cori Bernardi, 
INDEPENDENT AUSTL. (Dec. 11, 2012), http://www.independentaustralia.net/2012/politics/to-
the-extreme-with-hard-cory-bernardi/; see also Tony Abbott will never be Prime Minister; FACEBOOK, 
https://www.facebook.com/pages/Tony-Abbott-will-never-be-prime-minister/274330505796 
(last visited Aug. 9, 2013). 
 8. The lawyers making the submissions were a loose association. Among the lawyers 
groups that made submissions were, initially, Lawyers for the Preservation of the Definition of 
Marriage (which included the author). This group grew to include a number of senior barristers, 
solicitors, and leading academic lawyers from across the country. They were joined in federal 
Parliamentary submissions by the Ambrose Centre. Others joined as part of the Tasmanian group, 
the Save Marriage Coalition, formed by former Senator Guy Barnett, which included lawyers, 
church, social and business groups. The lawyers made the first round of submissions in order to 
delineate between the constitutional arguments and those that were contestable on the basis of 
evidence or values. See Rochow, supra note 7, at 5–6. Upon invitation from the New South Wales 
Legislative Assembly, a submission was made by Lawyers for the Preservation of the Definition of 
Marriage. That submission was supportive of the submissions made by the other groups. Those 
expressing a view against the constitutionality of the proposed law included eminent 
constitutional lawyer David Jackson QC, who submitted on behalf of the New South Wales 
Attorney General’s Department. New South Wales Department of Attorney General and Justice, 
Inquiry into Same Sex Marriage Law in NSW, Submission 1240 (Mar. 8, 2013), available at 
http://www.parliament.nsw.gov.au/prod/parlment/committee.nsf/0/28F03B123C7637C1CA25
7B2D000652DC. 
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diluted the effect of ad hominem attacks as a distraction from principal 
issues. 
Originally, the public debate concentrated principally on whether 
legislation permitting same-sex marriage should be passed.9 These 
arguments could largely be advanced in any jurisdiction. And it 
seemed a debate destined to be won by the loudest and last to speak. 
Introduction of constitutional arguments, however, raised the less 
obvious but logically anterior question: whether same-sex marriage 
laws could validly be passed. Submissions before a federal House of 
Representatives select committee,10 a federal Senate select 
committee,11 the Tasmanian Legislative Council,12 members of the 
South Australian Legislative Council, and the New South Wales 
Legislative Council committee13 have shown that arguments as to 
why legislation should not be passed are not effective in persuading 
undecided legislators unless combined with reasons why the 
legislation could not be validly passed. 
This Article first deals with constitutional arguments at the 
federal legislative level and then at the state level as to why same-sex 
marriage legislation could not be validly passed. The Article then deals 
with how those arguments relate to why the legislation should not be 
passed. Finally, the Article makes some observations about the 
significance of constitutional arrangements in the way that western 
democracies can and should be governed. 
The broad range of arguments that were advanced against state 
same-sex legislation in Tasmania has been the subject of treatment 
by this author elsewhere.14 Similar arguments were advanced 
 
 9. Mary Anne Neilsen, Same-sex Marriage, PARLIAMENT OF AUSTL. (Feb. 10, 2012), 
http://www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/Parliamentary_Departments/Parliamentary_Library/
pubs/BN/2011-2012/SameSexMarriage. 
 10. Inquiry into the Marriage Equality Amendment Bill 2012 and the Marriage Amendment Bill 
2012, PARLIAMENT OF AUSTL, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES COMMITTEES,
http://www.aph.gov.au/P 
arliamentary_Business/Committees/House_of_Representatives_Committees?url=spla/bill%20
marriage/index.htm (last visited Aug. 9, 2013). 
 11. Marriage Equality Amendment Bill 2010: Submissions Received by the Committee, 
PARLIAMENT OF AUSTL., SENATE COMMITTEES, 
http://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/S 
enate_Committees?url=legcon_ctte/completed_inquiries/2010-13/marriage_equality_2012/submissions.htm. 
 12. Rochow, supra note 7. 
 13. Same Sex Marriage Law in NSW (Inquiry), PARLIAMENT OF NEW S. WALES, 
http://www.parliament.nsw.gov.au/samesexmarriage (last visited Aug. 9, 2103). 
 14. Rochow, supra note 7, at 5. Those arguments can be summarized as follows: 
The legislation was in breach of an electoral promise not to introduce it. 
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subsequently, though less formally, with members of Parliament in 
South Australia, where no parliamentary inquiry has been held. They 
were also presented to the New South Wales Legislative Council 
inquiry.15 In Tasmania, the arguments were not confined to the 
constitutional arguments under consideration here, but included 
value-based arguments as well. However, the presence of the 
constitutional arguments lent strength to the other value-based 
arguments that were presented.16 
Before turning to the constitutional arguments as outlined, it is 
useful to make a few observations concerning one of the arguments 
advanced in opposition to legislation permitting same-sex marriage. 
Opponents argue that passage of the legislation undermines 
freedoms of religion, speech, thought, and practice according to 
conscience.17 The implicit premise in this argument (and the 
concern underlying it) is that once passed, the same-sex marriage 
legislation will combine with anti-discrimination legislation18 to 
produce new legal burdens on religion. Specifically, it would become 
unlawful for those with strongly held beliefs concerning the 
wrongness of homosexual relations to refuse to solemnize such 
marriages or to preach against them.19 The counter has been the 
promise by proponents of same-sex marriage to exempt religions 
from any obligation to perform same-sex ceremonies. This promise 
of exemption has been regarded with suspicion by opponents as 
either a temporary sop in exchange for passage and that, in practice, 
will not go far enough to protect their rights.20 
 
There would be considerable doubt as to the constitutional validity of a state Act. 
If there were to be any such legislation, it should be a matter to be resolved federally and not 
state by state. If necessary, a national referendum should be held to amend the constitution and 
to test the will of the electorate under section 128 of the federal Constitution. 
The Tasmanian bill had serious drafting and logical flaws. 
The passing of an invalid law would give rise to potentially expensive constitutional litigation 
involving both the state and individuals. 
Marriage is a bed-rock social institution worthy of protection. 
Claims that same-sex marriage is a human right have no foundation. 
The asserted international trend is illusory. 
The legislation posed a threat to free speech when combined with anti-discrimination 
legislation. 
The law has an educative role and this form of legislation sends a wrong message to the 
community. 
 15. Same Sex Marriage Law in NSW (Inquiry), supra note 13. 
 16. See Rochow, supra.note 7. 
 17. See WILBERFORCE FOUND., supra note 1; Zimmerman, supra note 1; Rochow, supra note 7. 
 18. See Zimmerman, supra note 1. 
 19. Id. 
 20. See WILBERFORCE FOUND., supra note 1; Zimmerman, supra note 1; Rochow, supra note 7. 
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At first blush the argument that same-sex legislation would 
impair liberties previously enjoyed by individuals appears to derive 
from a perception as to how anti-discrimination legislation might be 
used to enforce a new dimension of political correctness if same-sex 
marriage were to be accorded the same legal standing as existing 
heterosexual marriage. Any new right to have a same-sex 
relationship solemnized as a marriage would inevitably impact, in 
some way, upon previously existing rights to preach against change 
to the status quo on marriage. The new right may even be designed 
in such a way as to trump previously held rights, particularly if the 
retention of those previous rights is seen to be inappropriate. In this 
sense, this argument is a slippery-slope style appeal to retention of 
status quo and could be advanced against any reform to marriage. 
On closer analysis, however, this argument contains an added 
sting that raises constitutional and political issues unique to 
Australia. In Australia, the right to religious liberty is at best 
tenuous as a matter of federal constitutional law. For peculiar 
historical, social, and political reasons, Australia is one of the few 
advanced democracies that has no federal bill of rights, entrenched 
or otherwise.21 Neither do the laws of the respective States and 
Territories provide any constitutional guarantees of religious liberty. 
While some jurisdictions have enacted religious anti-vilification 
laws, the rights conferred are fraught with controversy as to how 
they operate, what freedoms are conferred, and whether they, in 
turn, are constitutionally valid.22  
 
 
 21. Neville Rochow, Paying for Human Rights Before the Bill Comes: Towards a More 
Comprehensive Domestic Implementation of International Human Rights Norms in Australia, UNIV. OF 
ADELAIDE L. SCH. (Mar. 9, 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1356382; Paul Babie & 
Neville Rochow, Feels Like Déjà vu: An Australian Bill of Rights and Religious Freedom, 2010 BYU L. 
REV. 821 (2010) [hereinafter Déjà vu]; Paul Babie & Neville Rochow, Protecting Religious Freedom 
under Bills of Rights: Australia as a Microcosm, in FREEDOM OF RELIGION UNDER BILLS OF RIGHTS 
(2012) . 
 22. As to the difficulties in invoking the anti-vilification legislation, see the decision of 
the Court of Appeal in Catch the Fire Ministries Inc. v Islamic Council of Victoria (2006) 15 VR 
207 (Austl.). See also Nicholas Aroney, The Constitutional (In)Validity of Religious Vilification 
Laws: Implications for their Interpretation 34 FED. L. REV. 287 (2006); Zimmerman, supra note 1; 
Neil Foster, Anti-Vilification Laws and Freedom of Religion in Australia- Is Defamation Enough?, 
Presentation at the Conference of the J. Reuben Clark Law Society and the Research Unit for 
the Study of Law, Society and Religion (June 8, 2013). For general a commentary of the 
protection of religious freedom in Australia, see CAROLYN MAREE EVANS, LEGAL PROTECTION 
OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM IN AUSTRALIA (2012), particularly chapter 8, which discusses cases, 
including Catch the Fire. 
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The only constitutional guarantee of religious liberty under 
Australian law is contained in section 116 of the federal 
Constitution.23 Although section 116 bears a close resemblance to 
the United States’ First Amendment from which it was drawn, 
because it is not found in a bill of rights,24 it has been given a very 
narrow construction: 
[Section 116] does not form part of a Bill of Rights. The plaintiff’s 
claim that it represents a personal guarantee of religious freedom 
loses much of its emotive and persuasive force . . . s. 116 is a 
denial of legislative power to the Commonwealth, and no more.25 
As observed by Paul Babie and me in our article, “Feels Like Déjà 
Vu,”26 opponents of a bill of rights commonly argued that existing 
common law rights were sufficient protection of individual rights. 
These opponents argued that a bill of rights would confer too much 
power on unelected judges and would lead to a wave of “US-style” 
rights litigation.27 It may seem ironic to some that the same 
conservative religionists who were ardent opponents of a bill of rights 
are arguing that their religious freedom would be compromised by 
same-sex legislation. On one view, it would be those very opponents of 
a bill of rights who now would stand to benefit most from a properly 
drafted set of guarantees of religious freedom. A bill of rights could have 
stood as a bulwark against the most feared effects of the new cocktail of 
rights that could result if same-sex marriage legislation and the new 
changes to discrimination laws proposed by the Human Rights and Anti-
Discrimination Bill 201228 were to be passed. The feared “US-style” rights 
litigation, of which opponents of bills of rights are so wont to warn, 
 
 23. AUSTRALIAN CONSTITUTION s 116 (“The Commonwealth shall not make any law for 
establishing any religion, or for imposing any religious observance, or for prohibiting the free 
exercise of any religion, and no religious test shall be required as a qualification for any office or 
public trust under the Commonwealth.”). 
 24. See Williams v Commonwealth (2012) 86 ALJR 713; Krygger v Williams (1912) 15 CLR 
366; Adelaide Company of Jehovah Witnesses Inc. v Commonwealth (1943) 67 CLR; Attorney General 
(Victoria); ex rel. Black v Commonwealth (1981) 146 CLR 559; Church of the New Faith v Commissioner 
for Payroll Tax (1983) 154 CLR 120; Kruger v Commonwealth (1997) 190 CLR 1; Grace Bible 
Church v Reedman (1984) 36 SASR 376; Harkianakis v Skalkos (1999) 47 NSWLR 302; see also 
Rochow, supra note 21, at 16–17. 
 25. Attorney-General (Vic); Ex rel Black v Commonwealth (DOGS Case) (1981) 146 CLR 559, 
652. 
 26. Déjà vu, supra note 21. 
 27. See, e.g., Patrick Parkinson, Christian Concerns about an Australian Charter of Rights, in 
FREEDOM OF RELIGION UNDER BILLS OF RIGHTS 117 (Paul Babie & Neville Rochow ed., 2012). 
 28. See WILBERFORCE FOUND., supra note 1. 
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may well be upon us in any event with none of the protections that 
might have otherwise existed. 
All attempts to date to enact same-sex legislation have failed and 
current state based bills seem likely to fail as well. The bills 
presented in federal Parliament were overwhelmingly defeated, 
including the most recent attempt to have internationally contracted 
same-sex marriages recognized as being lawful in Australia.29 The 
Tasmanian bill was defeated in that State’s upper house, the 
Legislative Council.30 Additionally, from discussions that the author 
has had with State political leaders and members of the respective 
houses, current South Australian attempts to pass a state-based law 
seem likely to be headed for defeat. Although it is uncertain whether 
other States will attempt to pass bills, there are equivalent bills 
being mooted in New South Wales and Western Australia.31 The 
most likely jurisdiction to pass a same-sex marriage bill is the 
Australian Capital Territory because of the strength of the leftist 
coalition of the Australian Labor Party and the Greens.32 The tenure 
of that legislation will be subject to federal territories power.33 
Because no bills have been passed, the validity and consequences 
of same-sex marriage legislation remain contestable. Constitutional 
arguments, experience teaches, have the capacity to sway undecided 
legislators who oppose same-sex legislation but need an acceptable 
value-neutral reason to vote against the bills. Thus, the constitution 
operates as a brake on certain types of reform well before matters are 
contested in court. 
 
 29. Chris Uhlmann, Parliament Votes Down Same-sex Marriage, ABC NEWS, 
http://www.abc.net.au/news/2012-09-19/parliament-votes-down-same-sex-marriage/4270700 
(last updated Sept. 19, 2012); Foreign Same Sex Marriage Recognition Bill Defeated, AUSTL. 
CHRISTIANS (June 20, 2013), http://australianchristians.com.au/foreign-same-sex-marriage-
recognition-bill-defeated/. 
 30. Tasmania’s Upper House Votes Down Gay Marriage, ABC NEWS, http://www.abc.net.au 
/news/2012-09-27/tasmania-upper-house-votes-down-gay-marriage/4284538 (last updated 
Sept. 28, 2012). 
          31. See, e.g., Same Sex Marriage Law in NSW (Inquiry), PARLIAMENT OF N.S.W., 
http://www.parliament.nsw.gov.au/samesexmarriage (last visited Aug. 12, 2013); Same-Sex 
Marriage Bill Set For Western Australia / Advocates Say Momentum ‘Unstoppable’, AUSTL. MARRIAGE 
EQUAL. (Sept. 13, 2012), http://www.australianmarriageequality.com/wp/tag/western-
australia/. 
 32. See, e.g., ACT Marriage Equality and the Constitution, AUSTL. MARRIAGE EQUAL. (Dec. 12, 
2012), http://www.australianmarriageequality.com/wp/tag/australian-capital-territory/. 
 33. AUSTRALIAN CONSTITUTION s 122. 
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II. COULD VALID FEDERAL LEGISLATION BE PASSED PERMITTING SAME-
SEX MARRIAGE IN AUSTRALIA? 
With only minor administrative exceptions, marriage has, since 
1961, been regulated nationally by a single federal statute, the 
Marriage Act 1961 (Cth). Passed to overcome the confused condition 
of matrimonial law when each state had its own laws, the Marriage 
Act would seem to constitute the most significant barrier to same-sex 
marriage legislation. However, if that Act were amended to redefine 
marriage to embrace same-sex marriages, there would be no 
impediment. If that Act has not driven state laws on the subject from 
the legislative field entirely, then states could pass individual laws 
permitting such marriages. 
 The Marriage Act operates to impede state-based marriage 
legislation. Section 109 of the federal Constitution34 provides that if 
there are two otherwise valid state and federal enactments that 
“cover[] the field,” the federal law will render the state law invalid to 
the extent of that state law’s inconsistency. Prior to 1961, marriage 
was a state matter and interstate recognition of matrimonial status 
was a matter determined by a combination of private international 
law and state-to-state comity. In 1961, the Marriage Act was passed 
federally with the intention of creating a single marriage law for 
Australia, with only very limited exceptions relating to the 
registration of marriages. By this enactment, it would appear that the 
federal parliament “covered the field” on the topic of marriage. 
In 2004, the Marriage Act was amended to contain a definition of 
marriage—the union of a man and a woman to the exclusion of all 
others, voluntarily entered into for life—and to prohibit recognition 
of same-sex marriages contracted overseas.35 This amendment came 
at a time when state-based same-sex marriage laws were not even in 
contemplation. By this enactment, it would appear that the federal 




 34. AUSTRALIAN CONSTITUTION s 109 (“When a law of a State is inconsistent with a law of 
the Commonwealth, the latter shall prevail, and the former shall, to the extent of the 
inconsistency, be invalid.”). 
 35. Marriage Act 1961 (Cth) s 88EA (introduced by the Marriage Amendment Act 2004 
(Cth)). As to its effect, see Geoffrey Lindell, State Legislative Power to Enact Same-Sex Marriage 
Legislation, and the Effect of the Marriage Act 1961 (Cth) as Amended by the Marriage Amendment 
Act 2004 (Cth), CONST. L. & POL’Y REV. 25 (2006). 
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The ability to amend the Marriage Act is therefore pivotal in the 
constitutional debate as to whether same-sex marriage legislation 
could be validly passed. 
The debate over whether the Commonwealth Parliament should 
legislate to allow same-sex marriages largely proceeded on an 
assumption that it could; that is that the federal Parliament had the 
power so to legislate. As is apparent from submissions made by legal 
professional bodies,36 the legal profession as a whole was not 
prepared to challenge that assumption. Lawyers were simply not 
putting the contrary case to the respective committees. As a 
consequence, the “should” arguments were prevailing, almost by 
default over arguments as to what the Parliament could do. 
There has always been, however, a real question as to whether 
Parliament possessed the power to legislate same-sex marriage in 
section 51 (xxi) and (xxii) of the Constitution. The question is 
whether the divorce and matrimonial power, though a separate and 
distinct power,37 could support a law allowing same-sex couples to 
marry if that power were not found in section 51 (xxi). Section 51 
(xxii) provides Parliament power to make laws with respect to 
“divorce and matrimonial causes,” that is, causes arising out of 
marriage.38 
If the power to legislate for same-sex marriage is not allowed 
under the marriage power, unless another power can be found, 
Parliament does not have the power to so legislate. Without an 
express power, the matter has to be made the subject of a 
referendum to amend pursuant to section 128 of the Constitution. 
A. Constitutional Interpretation: Marriage Power and the Originalist 
Approach 
The High Court has recently reiterated: 
[T]he task of statutory construction must begin with a 
consideration of the text itself. Historical considerations and 
extrinsic materials cannot be relied on to displace the clear meaning 
 
 36. See Inquiry into the Marriage Amendment Bill 2012 and Marriage Equality Amendment Bill 
2012, HOUSE STANDING COMMITTEE ON SOC. POL’Y AND LEGAL AFF., http://www.aph.gov.au/parli 
amentary_business/committees/house_of_representatives_committees?url=spla/bill%20marria
ge/index.htm (last visited Aug. 12, 2013). 
 37. AUSTRALIAN CONSTITUTION s 51(xxii); Re F; Ex Parte F (1986) 161 CLR 376, 401. 
 38. Re F; Ex Parte F (1986) 161 CLR 376, 401; see also id. at 407 (matrimonial causes are 
“those matters which are subsidiary and consequential to marriage and divorce”). 
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of the text. The language which has actually been employed in the 
text of legislation is the surest guide to legislative intention. The 
meaning of the text may require consideration of the context, 
which includes the general purpose and policy of a provision, in 
particular the mischief it is seeking to remedy.39  
When interpreting section 51 (xxii) of the Constitution, the 
meanings of the “matrimonial cause” and “divorce” have no potential 
for ambiguity. These phrases have been applied consistently without 
question over at least a century.40 In that time, they have never been 
applied to any legal relationship other than traditional heterosexual 
marriage. Nothing in the wording of the power suggests of anything 
broader. 
Even if one were to concede that those terms were ambiguous 
and it became necessary to embark upon an originalist interpretation 
of the constitutional phrases through a “search for the intention of 
its makers,”41 the result would not differ. In interpretation by 
reference to historical context, the High Court distinguishes between 
connotation and denotation, or the difference between meaning and 
application.42 
In Ex parte Professional Engineers Association, Justice Windeyer said: 
We must not, in interpreting the Constitution, restrict the 
denotation of its terms to things they denoted in 1900. The 
denotation of words becomes enlarged as new things falling within 
their connotations come into existence or become known. But in 
the interpretation of the Constitution the connotation or 
connotations of its words should remain constant. We are not to 
give words a meaning different from any meaning which they could 
have borne in 1900. . . . It is not to be changed as language 
changes.43 
 
 39. Alcan (NT) Alumina Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Territory Revenue (2009) 239 CLR 27, 46 
(footnote omitted). 
 40. Australian courts have accepted the definition current since at least the nineteenth 
century when Lord Penzance pronounced his famous dictum in the divorce case of a polygamous 
wife in Hyde v Hyde (1866) 1 P.D. 130, 133 (Eng.) (“I conceive that marriage, as understood in 
Christendom, may for this purpose be defined as the voluntary union for life of one man and one 
woman, to the exclusion of all others.”). See also Fisher v Fisher (1986) 161 CLR 438, 456 
(Austl.). 
 41. Re Wakim; Ex Parte McNally (1999) 198 CLR 511, 551. 
 42. Id. at 552. 
 43. (1959) 107 CLR 208, 267.; see also R v Brislan; Ex Parte Williams (1935) 54 CLR 262, 
282 (Rich & Evatt, JJ). 
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Parliament cannot deem what meaning may be given to a 
particular power in the Constitution so as to expand its content. 
Further, as was observed by Justice McHugh in Re Wakim:  
[T]he judiciary has no power to amend or modernise the 
Constitution to give effect to what the judges think is in the public 
interest. The function of the judiciary, including the function of this 
Court [the High Court], is to give effect to the intention of the 
makers of the Constitution as evinced by the terms in which they 
expressed that intention. That necessarily means that decisions, taken 
almost a century ago by people long dead, bind the people of Australia today 
even in cases where most people agree that those decisions are out 
of touch with the present needs of Australian society.44 
Further, in Cormick v Cormick,45 Chief Justice Gibbs observed: 
It would be a fundamental misconception of the operation of the 
Constitution to suppose that the Parliament itself could effectively 
declare that particular facts are sufficient to bring about the 
necessary connexion with a head of legislative power so as to justify 
an exercise of that power. It is for the courts, and not for the 
Parliament, to decide on the validity of legislation . . . .46 
Justices Mason, Wilson, Deane, and Dawson concurred in Chief 
Justice Gibbs’s reasoning.47 Two members of that unanimous court 
(Justices Mason and Brennan) went on to later become Chief 
Justices.48 Of those two, Justice Brennan added additional reasoning, 
“The scope of the marriage power conferred by section 51(xxi) of the 
Constitution is to be determined by reference to what falls within 
the conception of marriage in the Constitution, not by reference to 
what the Parliament deems to be, or to be within, that 
conception.”49 
With particular reference to the marriage power, Justice Brennan 
(as his Honour then was) observed in Fisher v Fisher:50 
 
 
 44. Re Wakim, 198 CLR at 549 (emphasis added). 
 45. (1984) 156 CLR 170. 
 46. Id. at 177. 
 47. Id. at 182. 
 48. Sir Anthony Mason was Chief Justice of Australia from 1987 to 1995. Sir Gerard 
Brennan succeeded him as Chief Justice in 1995 and retired in 1998. 
 49. Id. 
 50. (1986) 161 CLR 438. 
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Marriage is a social and legal institution. . . . The nature and 
incidents of the legal institution which the Constitution recognises 
as “marriage” and which lie within the power conferred by section 
51(xxi) are ascertained not by reference to laws enacted in 
purported pursuance of the power but by reference to the customs 
of our society, especially when they are reflected in the common 
law, which show the content of the power as it was conferred. The 
words “with respect to” in section 51 in their application to the 
marriage power are not needed to bring the customary incidents of 
marriage within the power. On the other hand, those words do not 
empower the Parliament to legislate upon the customary incidents 
of marriage so as to affect the nature of the marriage relationship.51 
Justices Mason52 and Deane, in Re F; Ex Parte F observed, 
“Obviously, the Parliament cannot extend the ambit of its own 
legislative powers by purporting to give to ‘Marriage’ an even wider 
meaning than that which the word bears in its constitutional 
context.”53 
Justice Dawson said, in relation to the provision of the Family 
Law Act under consideration in Comick, deeming certain children to 
be children of a marriage, “It is well established that the reach of a 
legislative power cannot be extended by this means.”54 
From these dicta, it seems clear that Parliament cannot extend its 
marriage power by mere definition.55 
A critical question to determine whether the Commonwealth 
Parliament has power to legislate to permit same-sex couples to 
marry is what was meant by “marriage” in 1900. Parliament has 
power to make laws with respect to that relationship, but does not 
have power to alter the nature of that relationship. 
B. Analogies With Other Legal Concepts Receiving Originalist Interpretation 
1. Analogy in trade mark law 
In 1908, shortly after federation, in Attorney-General for the State of 
 
 51. Id. at 455–56 (emphasis added). 
 52. As his Honour then was. 
 53. (1986) 161 CLR 376, 389. 
 54. Id. at 465. 
 55. This is opposed to defining the content of a valid exercise within existing power, 
which, arguably, is what it has done in defining marriage in the 2004 amendment to the 
Marriage Act 1961 (Cth). 
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New South Wales v Brewery Employees’ Union of New South Wales and 
Ors,56 the High Court considered the meaning of the words “trade 
mark” in the phrase “worker’s trade mark” to determine whether it 
was subject matter within the legislative power with respect to 
trademarks under section 51 (xviii). The majority approached the 
question by, first, ascertaining what was meant by “trade mark” in 
1900.57 It then considered whether the mark in issue, a “worker’s 
trade mark,” was a trade mark within the meaning as understood at 
that time.58 As a “worker’s trade mark” was not within the 
connotation of legal meaning for the species of property known as 
“trade marks” in 1900, the marks under consideration were held not 
to be “trade marks” for the purposes of the legislative power.59 
Chief Justice Griffith, after identifying the elements of a 
trademark in 1900, said: 
With regard to this species of property the power of the Parliament 
is absolute. They can prescribe the conditions on which it may be 
acquired, retained, or enjoyed; they may possibly even prohibit its 
enjoyment altogether; but they cannot, by calling something else by 
the name of “trade mark,” create a new and different kind of 
industrial property.60 
Additionally, Justice Barton said: 
[I]t is to the meaning in 1900 that we must look, for the plain 
reason that the Constitution previously framed in Australia became 
law in that year, and the framers cannot, of course, have had in 
their minds meanings which had not then come into existence.61 
Justice O’Connor also discussed the essential features of a trade 
mark in 1900 and said: 
I take it, therefore, as established that the concept covered by the 
legal expression “trade mark,” as used by the legislature, the 
Courts, and the commercial community in England and Australia at 
the time of the passing of the Constitution, necessarily involved the 
two essentials I have mentioned. It would follow that the power 
 
 56. (1908) 6 CLR 469. 
 57. Id. at 500–03, 508–13 (Griffith, CJ); id. at 521–25, 529–30 (Barton, J.); id. at 531, 534–
38 (O’Connor, J.). 
 58. See sources cited supra note 57. 
 59. See sources cited supra note 57. 
 60. Brewery Employees’ Union, 6 CLR at 513. 
 61. Id. at 521. 
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conferred upon the Commonwealth Parliament to make laws in 
respect of trade marks extends only to trade marks having these 
essential qualities, and that it cannot extend to any mark used in 
trade which is wanting in any of those essentials. Nor can the 
Commonwealth Parliament give itself jurisdiction merely by 
declaring that a mark created by its authority for use in trade is a 
trade mark within the meaning of the Constitution. It cannot thus 
expand its powers by its own legislative act and so assume a larger  
control over the internal trade of a State than the Constitution has 
conferred on it.62 
Justice Higgins, (who, with Justice Isaacs, was in the minority), 
took a broader view of the powers available to the Commonwealth 
Parliament. His Honour reasoned that power to make laws with 
respect to trade marks is not the same as power to regulate or 
enforce trade marks.63 Relevantly, his Honour observed by way of 
analogy, “Under the power to make laws with respect to ‘marriage’ I 
should say that the Parliament could prescribe what unions are to be 
regarded as marriages.”64 
This minority view that would support an ability to change the 
connotation of a power has not been accepted, as appears from the 
more recent authority cited above. However, even acceptance of this 
approach would still place legislation with regard to homosexual 
marriages beyond the scope of the marriage power. This appears 
from what follows the dictum cited above: 
No doubt, we are to ascertain the meaning of “trade marks” as in 1900. 
But having ascertained that meaning, we have then to find the 
extent . . . of the “power to make laws with respect to trade marks.” 
The usage in 1900 gives us the central type; it does not give us the 
circumference of the power. To find the circumference of the power,  
 
 
 62. Id. at 541. While there is a flavor of the reserved powers doctrine in the majority 
judgments, which was overturned in Amalgamated Society of Engineers v Adelaide Steamship Co 
(1920) 28 CLR 129, the fall of that doctrine does not affect the validity of the reasoning in 
relation to constitutional interpretation. This is made apparent by Davis and Ors v The 
Commonwealth of Australia (1988) 166 CLR 79 in which case Chief Justice Mason, Justice Deane, 
and Justice Gaudron accepted, by way of illustration, that the denotation of trade marks had 
increased, but did not doubt the correctness of the majority’s approach to the connotation of the 
power. Id. at 96–97. For a treatment of the reserved powers doctrine, see GABRIEL MOENS & JOHN 
TRONE, LUMB AND MOENS’ THE CONSTITUTION OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA ANNOTATED 
203–05 (6th ed. 2001). 
 63. Brewery Employees’ Union, 6 CLR at 610. 
 64. Id. 
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we take as a centre the thing named - trade marks - with the meaning 
as in 1900; but it is a mistake to treat the centre as the radius.65 
His Honour further stated that the proponents of the majority 
view were treating the power to deal with trade marks like a power 
to deal with cattle.66 If a beast did not come within the term “cattle,” 
as it was understood in 1900, there was no power to make laws with 
respect to it. His Honour reasoned that the difference between cattle 
and trade marks was that the boundaries of the class “cattle” was 
fixed by external nature, while the concept of “trade marks” is a 
social construct.67 
2. Analogy with the institution of the jury 
There is also an analogy to be drawn between the institution of 
marriage and that of the jury. In Cheatle and Another v The Queen68 the 
High Court considered the meaning of “jury.” Section 80 of the 
Constitution requires that the trial on indictment of an offence 
against any law of the Commonwealth must be by jury.69 Section 
57(1) of the Juries Act 1927 (SA) allowed for majority verdicts.70 
However the High Court held that section 80 of the Constitution 
required a jury verdict to be unanimous.71 After examining the 
history of the institution of trial by jury the Court said: 
It follows from what has been said above that the history of 
criminal trial by jury in England and in this country up until the 
time of Federation establishes that, in 1900, it was an essential 
feature of the institution that an accused person could not be 
convicted otherwise than by the agreement or consensus of all the 
jurors. It is well settled that the interpretation of a constitution 
such as ours is necessarily influenced by the fact that its provisions 
are framed in the language of the English common law, and are to 
 
 65. Id. The center or essence of marriage in 1900 was “the voluntary union for life of one 
man and one woman, to the exclusion of all others.” R v L (1991) 174 CLR 379, 391 (quoting 
Calverley v Green (1984) 155 CLR 242, 259–60). A law expressly contrary to that essence, would, 
in the reasoning of Justice Higgins, be a law that sought to change the center of the power and 
would, therefore, be beyond power. 
 66. Brewery Employees’ Union, 6 CLR at 611. 
 67. Id. 611–16 (referring to several social abstractions to illustrate the point). 
68. (1993) 177 CLR 541. 
 69. AUSTRALIAN CONSTITUTION s 80. 
 70. Juries Act 1927 (SA) s 57(a). 
 71. Cheatle, 177 CLR at 560–61. See also Katsuno v R (1999) 199 CLR 40 (adopting the 
reasoning of Cheatle). 
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be read in the light of the common law’s history. In the context of 
the history of criminal trial by jury, one would assume that 
[section] 80’s directive that the trial to which it refers must be by 
jury was intended to encompass the requirement of unanimity.72 
 C. The Legal Nature and Essence of Marriage 
On the legal nature of marriage, Justice Brennan73 did not 
consider marriage to be a social construct. Rather, in The Queen v L,74 
his Honour cited with approval eighteenth and nineteenth century 
dicta75 in support of the observation that marriage is “a contract 
according to the law of nature, antecedent to civil institution, . . . a 
contract of the greatest importance in civil institutions . . . .”76 
In that case, his Honour also observed that the definition of 
marriage as ‘the voluntary union for life of one man and one woman, 
to the exclusion of all others’ was one that had been  
followed in this country and by this Court” and that it was “the 
definition adopted by the Family Law Act, [section] 43(a) [] which 
requires a court exercising jurisdiction under that Act to have 
regard to ‘the need to preserve and protect the institution of 
marriage as the union of a man and a woman to the exclusion of all 
others voluntarily entered into for life.’77 
In Attorney-General for the State of Victoria v The Commonwealth of 
Australia,78 Justice McTiernan made the following observation on 
‘marriage’: 
The term marriage bears its own limitations and Parliament cannot 
enlarge its meaning. In the context – the Constitution – the term 
“marriage” should receive its full grammatical and ordinary sense: 
plainly in this context it means only monogamous marriage. In my 
view, the term in par. (xxi.) refers to marriage as a social 
transaction: but as the term marks the outer limits of the power 




 72. Chealte, at 552 (citations omitted). 
 73. As His Honour then was. 
 74. (1991) 174 CLR 379. 
 75. Lindo v Belisaro, [1795] Eng. Rep. 4123, (1795) 1 Hag. Con. 216 at 230–31 (Eng.); 
Hyde v Hyde (1866) 1 P.D. 130, 144 (Eng.). 
 76. R v L, 174 CLR at 391–92. 
 77. Id. 
 78. (1962) 107 CLR 529. 
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the term cannot be extended further than to embrace uniting in 
marriage and the status of marriage.79 
Also, Chief Justice Dixon said: 
It may be said at once that the power conferred by [section] 51 
(xxi.) should receive no narrow or restrictive construction. In Quick 
and Garran at p. 608 a wide connotation of the words “with respect 
to marriage” is suggested by a reference to a denotation which 
perhaps needs a little explanation. For it covers “consequences of 
the relation including the status of the married parties, their 
mutual rights and obligations, the legitimacy of children and their 
civil rights.” These are indefinite and highly abstract words but the 
status of the married parties evidently refers to the particular legal 
position . . . which unmarried persons do not share; their mutual 
rights and obligations means those arising out of the married state 
and the legitimacy of children refers to the status of children born to 
them in wedlock.80  
There seems no room for doubt that in 1900 marriage was “the 
voluntary union for life of one man and one woman, to the exclusion 
of all others.”81 That definition has been accepted by the High Court 
in Calverley v Green,82 where Justice Mason and Justice Brennan (as 
they both then were) said, “The exclusive union for life which is 
undertaken by both spouses to a valid marriage . . . remains the 
foundation of the legal institution of marriage.”83 
In Re F.; Ex parte F84 the High Court unanimously disallowed 
section 5(1)(e)(i) of the Family Law Act which deemed a child of one 
of the parties to a marriage who was ordinarily a member of the 
household of the husband and wife to be a child of the marriage. 
Justice Brennan (as he then was), with whom Chief Justice Gibbs 
and Justice Wilson generally agreed, made the following observation: 
“Marriage” as a subject of legislative power embraces those 
relationships which the law (leaving aside statutes enacted in 
 
 79. Id. at 549 (emphasis added). 
 80. Id. at 543. It is clear that his Honour considered that the connotation of the power 
was that the parties to a marriage were a man and a woman. 
 81. Hyde v Hyde, (1866) 1 P.D. 130 (Eng.); see also Harrod v Harrod (1854) 1 K.&J. 4, 15, 
16 (Eng.); HALSBURY’S LAWS OF ENGLAND VOL. 13, 351 (3d ed. 1951); BOOK OF COMMON PRAYER, 
FORM OF SOLEMNIZATION OF MARRIAGE (1662); Genesis 1:24–25. 
 82. (1984) 155 CLR 242. 
 83. Id. at 259–60; see also Khan v Khan [1963] VR 203, 204. 
 84. (1986) 161 CLR 376. 
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purported exercise of the power) recognizes as the relationships 
which subsist between husband, wife and the children of the 
marriage. Statutes enacted in purported exercise of the power 
cannot extend the scope of the power: only those relationships 
which are already embraced within the subject are amenable to 
regulation by a law enacted in exercise of the power. The subject 
does not embrace the relationship between, on the one hand, the 
spouses and, on the other, a child born of an extra-marital 
association of a spouse with another person. To treat such a child 
as a child of the marriage of the spouses when he or she has not 
been adopted by them is to exclude or diminish the relationship 
between the child and the parent who is not one of the spouses.85 
In Fisher v Fisher86 Justice Brennan said, “The relationships 
between husband, wife and the children of a marriage, which are at 
the heart of the marriage power, are essentially personal, not 
proprietary.”87 
In Re Cormick,88 Chief Justice Gibbs said, 
It is now well settled that “marriage” in [section] 51(xxi) includes 
the relationship or institution of marriage and, since the protection 
and nurture of the children of the marriage is at the very heart of 
the relationship, that the power to make laws with respect to 
marriage enables the Parliament to define and enforce the rights of 
a party to the marriage with respect to the custody and 
guardianship of a child of the marriage. The rights and duties of the 
parties to a marriage, with respect to the children of the marriage, 
arise directly out of the marriage relationship, and a law defining, 
regulating or modifying the incidents of the marriage relationship is 
a law with respect to marriage.89 
It would appear then on an originalist interpretation, references 
to “marriage” and “matrimonial causes” in the text of section 51 
would most likely be construed to refer to the legal relationship 
between a man and a woman as it was known in 1900. Such an 
interpretation makes federal same-sex marriage legislation 
questionable at best and most likely invalid if passed. 
 
 85. Id. at 399. 
 86. (1986) 161 CLR 428. 
 87. Id. at 454–55. 
 88. (1984) 156 CLR 170. 
 89. Id. at 175–76. 
DO NOT DELETE 1/29/2014 10:01 AM 
521 “. . . Speak Now or Forever Hold Your Peace . . .” 
 541 
D. External Affairs as a Source of Legislative Power 
There is the possibility that the external affairs power, found in 
section 51 (xxix) of the federal Constitution, could allow the 
Commonwealth Parliament to legislate for same-sex marriage.90 To 
invoke this head of power, a binding international covenant to so 
legislate needs to be identified. 
To date, no covenant sufficient for that purpose has been 
identified by proponents of same-sex marriage. It seems that a clear 
obligation to legislate for same-sex marriage can be identified. At 
best, it would seem that proponents might identify wording in a 
covenant that might permit such marriages, but not to oblige 
Australia, as a covenanting state to so legislate. 
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) works 
upon the same assumption underlying the marriage power, namely 
that marriage is the union between a man and a woman. 
Article 16 of the UDHR provides: 
(1) Men and women of full age, without any limitation due to race, 
nationality or religion, have the right to marry and to found a 
family. They are entitled to equal rights as to marriage, during 
marriage and at its dissolution. 
(2) Marriage shall be entered into only with the free and full 
consent of the intending spouses. 
(3) The family is the natural and fundamental group unit of society 
and is entitled to protection by society and the State.91 
If there is no apparent support for an obligation to provide for 
same-sex marriage under the UDHR, neither does there seem to 
be any support in other international covenants. Article 23(2) of 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, for 
example, similarly recognizes the right of men and women of 
marriageable age to marry and found a family but does not extend 
to same gender couples.92 Neither does there seem to be any 
 
 90. IAN IRELAND, LAW AND BILLS DIGEST GRP., INFO. AND RESEARCH SERVS., RESEARCH 
NOTE: THE HIGH COURT AND THE MEANING OF ‘MARRIAGE’ IN SECTION 51(XXI) OF THE 
CONSTITUTION (Feb. 12, 2003), available at http://www.aph.gov.au/library/pubs/m/2001-
01/02m17.pdf. 
 91. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. Doc. 
A/RES/217(III) (Dec. 10, 1948), available at http://www.un.org/en/documents/udhr/. 
 92. The Law Council of Australia Submission to the Senate of April 2, 2012, LAW 
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potential support from European human rights provisions or the 
treatment of claims to particular marriage rights claims made in the 
European Court of Human Rights.93 
Without a clear international obligation to legislate for same-sex 
marriage, there is simply no basis for use of the external affairs 
power. 
E. Conclusion on the Federal Ability to Pass Legislation Permitting Same-Sex 
Marriage 
One can never predict the outcome of constitutional litigation in 
a court of last resort with absolute certainty. However, unless the 
High Court were to depart from a considerable body of precedent 
and refuse to adopt either an approach to the construction of the 
relevant power that departed radically from its previous approaches 
to the relevant powers and the meaning of marriage, it would seem 
that there are very strong arguments as to why any federal Act may 
well be declared as being beyond Parliament’s power. 
III. COULD VALID STATE LEGISLATION BE PASSED PERMITTING SAME-SEX 
MARRIAGE IN AUSTRALIA? 
It seems generally accepted that prior to 1961, states could likely 
have passed valid laws permitting same-sex marriage because they 
were not tied to express heads of legislative power in the same way 
as the federal Parliament.94 The question now is whether the 
 
COUNCIL OF AUSTL., LAW COUNCIL SUBMISSION TO THE SENATE INQUIRY ON MARRIAGE EQUALITY 
AMENDMENT BILL 2010 74–75 (Apr. 2, 2012), available at 
http://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/Senate_Committees?url=legcon_ctte/comple
ted_inquiries/2010-13/marriage_equality_2012/submissions.htm, seems to acknowledge as much in 
its reference to Joslin v New Zealand, Communication No. 902/1999, U.N. Doc. A/57/40 at 214 
(2002), where it was held that states were only required to recognize the union between a man 
and a woman who wanted to marry each other. 
 93. See, e.g., European Convention on Human Rights arts. 8, 12, 14, Nov. 4. 1950, 213 
U.N.T.S. 221 (identifying a right to respect for private and family life, prohibiting 
discrimination, and identifying a right to marriage, respectively); Schalk & Kopf v Austria, 
App. No. 30141/04,  Eur. Ct. H.R. 995 (2010) (finding no breach of Articles 12 and 14 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights and holding that states have no obligation to provide 
marriage for same-sex couples); 
Gas & Dubois c. France, App. No. 25951/07 (2012), available at 
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/fra/pages/search.aspx?i=001-109571#{“itemid”:[“001-
109571”]} (finding no breach of Articles 8 and 14 of the European Convention on Human 
Rights when a lesbian couple was refused an adoption). 
 94. There is an argument, along originalist lines, that could be advanced that the state 
DO NOT DELETE 1/29/2014 10:01 AM 
521 “. . . Speak Now or Forever Hold Your Peace . . .” 
 543 
Marriage Act 1961, including the 2004 amendments to confirm the 
definition of marriage as being between a man and a woman and to 
exclude recognition of foreign same-sex marriage, prevents the 
passage of state laws permitting such marriages. 
Although there have been various state bills drafted, to date, the 
Tasmanian bill is the only bill to have passed any legislative chamber 
and to have been the subject of extensive debate in the chamber in 
which it was defeated.95 Therefore, the Tasmanian bill will be the 
focus of this section. In voting against the Bill, several opponents 
cited constitutional arguments and the consequent costs of litigation 
as reasons to vote the Bill down. 
The Tasmanian Same-Sex Marriage Bill 2012 (the Bill) provided at 
clause 3 that “same sex marriage means the lawful union of two 
people of the same sex to the exclusion of all others, voluntarily 
entered into for life.”96 It should be noted that the definition mimics 
the definition of marriage in the federal Marriage Act 1961 with the 
difference that rather than a union between a man and a woman, the 
Bill purported to provide for same-sex marriage as a union between 
two people of the same-sex. 
The Bill then purported to establish a regime for same-sex 
“marriage.”97 In essence, the Bill clearly intended to create a 
complete system parallel to that created by the Marriage Act, but to 
apply exclusively to same-sex marriages. 
 
legislative power is commensurately constitutionally impaired by section 106 of the federal 
Constitution. If the definition of marriage is restricted to what was known as marriage in 
1900, the state constitutions are likewise restricted. Section 106 provides, “[T]he 
Constitution of each State of the Commonwealth shall, subject to this Constitution, continue 
as at the establishment of the Commonwealth, or as at the admission or establishment of the 
State, as the case may be, until altered in accordance with the Constitution of the State.” 
AUSTRALIAN CONSTITUTION s. 106. 
 95. First Step For Gay Marriage Laws, ABC NEWS (Aug. 29, 2012, 8:56 AM), 
http://www.abc.net.au/news/2012-08-28/first-step-for-gay-marriage-laws/4227122; Dylan 
Carmichael, Same Sex Marriage Act 2012 (Tamania) Debate, Day 1, DYLAN CARMICHAEL’S BLOG 
(Sept. 26, 2012), http://dcarm85.wordpress.com/2012/09/. 
 96. Same-Sex Marriage Bill 2012 (Tas). 
 97. Part 1 of the Bill contains the interpretation section, which contains the definition of 
same-sex “marriage.” Id. Part 2 sets up a scheme in relation to same-sex “marriages” and deals 
with marriageable age, procedure for solemnisation of same-sex marriages, marriage certificates 
and offences. Id. Part 3 deals with dissolution and annulment of same-sex “marriages”, Part 4 
with proceedings for financial adjustment and maintenance and, Part 5 with financial 
arrangements. Id. Part 6 addresses recognition of same-sex “marriages” under corresponding 
laws, Part 7 with authorized celebrants, and Part 8 with miscellaneous matters. Id. 
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A. The Marriage Act 
The Marriage Act established a regime for dealing with marriage 
in Australia. Part I of the Act deals with preliminary matters. This 
part defines marriage as “the union of a man and a woman to the 
exclusion of all others, voluntarily entered into for life.”98 
Part I also contains section 6, which provides that the Marriage 
Act does not exclude the operation of State laws with respect to the 
registration of marriages. It seems clear that this provision is 
intended to permit only limited concurrent operation for state 
laws.99 Part VA deals with the recognition of foreign marriages.100 
Section 88B (4), which is part of Part VA, adopts the Marriage Act 
definition of marriage in relation to the question of the recognition 
of foreign marriages.101 Section 88EA, which is also in Part VA, 
provides: 
A union solemnised in a foreign country between: 
a man and a another man; or 
a woman and another woman: 
must not be recognised as a marriage in Australia.102 
While it may be pointed out that section 88B does not seek to 
deal with State “marriage” relationships, it is a fair response to make 
that no such legal institution was in contemplation at the time 
because the states had acquiesced in the Commonwealth plenary 
exercise of power. As is apparent from the earlier discussion, there 
never has been any other legal institution described as “marriage” in 
Australia other than as between man and a woman. 
It seems clear that the Marriage Act operates to create a code in 
relation to the institution of marriage in Australia other than in 
respect of registration. Indeed, when the Marriage Act was introduced 
 
 98. Marriage Act 1961 (Cth) s 5(1). 
 99. Other Parts of the Act deal with matters relating directly or indirectly with marriage. 
Part IA addresses marriage education, Part II the question marriageable age and the marriage of 
minors, Part III deals with void marriages and Part IV with the solemnization of marriages in 
Australia. Part V addresses marriages of members of the Defence Force Overseas. Part VI deals 
with the legitimation of children by virtue of marriage of parents, Part VII with offences, Part 
VIII with transitional provisions and Part IX with miscellaneous matters. 
 100. Marriage Act 1961 (Cth) s VA. 
 101. Id. s 88B(4). 
 102. Id. s 88EA. 
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to Parliament in 1961, the then-Attorney-General, Sir Garfield 
Barwick, said that the purpose of the legislation was to “produce a 
marriage code suitable to present-day Australian needs.”103 
It appears a part of that purpose was to rid the legal landscape of 
the different pieces of State legislation on the topic of “marriage.” In 
this regard, the observations by the Attorney-General as to state laws 
in 1961 are pertinent now: 
At the present time, the marriage laws of the several States and of 
the Territories to which this bill applies are diverse. The 
recognition in one State of the marriage status acquired in another 
rests entirely upon the rules of private international law worked out 
over many generations to regulate such questions as between 
independent, and in relation to each other, foreign States. The bill 
would replace this diverse body of statutory law and render 
unnecessary any resort to the rules of private international law to 
determine, in the Commonwealth or in any Territory, the efficacy 
and validity of a marriage solemnised or a legitimation effected 
within the Commonwealth and the Territories to which the bill 
applies, or indeed outside the Commonwealth if the marriage is 
celebrated under part 4.104 
B. Validity of the Bill if Passed into Law: The Inconsistency Question – 
Section 109 of the Constitution 
 There is an obvious question of inconsistency between the 
Marriage Act and the Bill under section 109 of the federal 
Constitution. Section 109 states, “When a law of a State is 
inconsistent with a law of the Commonwealth, the latter shall 
prevail, and the former shall, to the extent of the inconsistency, be 
invalid.”105 “Invalidity” in the context of section 109, means that the 
state law is rendered inoperative as long as the Commonwealth law 
is effective. If the Commonwealth law were to be repealed, then the 
State law would revive.106 
 
 
 103. Olivia Rundle, An Examination of Relationship Registration Schemes in Australia, 25 
AUSTL. J. FAM. L. 121, 126 (2011) (quoting  Garfield Barwick, The Commonwealth Marriage Act 
1961, 3 MELBOURNE UNIV. L. REV. 277, 277 (1962)). 
 104. Cth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 19 May 1960, 2001 (Garfield 
Barwick, Attorney-General). 
 105. AUSTRALIAN CONSTITUTION s 109. 
 106. Butler v Attorney General (Vic) (1961) 106 CLR 268. 
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There are two tests that the High Court has developed in order 
to determine whether a State law is inconsistent with a 
Commonwealth law. The first is whether there is a direct 
inconsistency between the laws.107 The second is whether the 
Commonwealth law evinces an intention to ‘cover the field’ and so 
an indirect inconsistency is created in the event that a State law 
purports to enter that field.108 
For section 109 to come into play, there must first be a valid law 
enacted by the Commonwealth parliament and an otherwise valid 
law passed by the particular state parliament.109 If one or the other 
law is otherwise invalid there is no need for recourse to section 109. 
Since there has never been any doubt expressed that the Marriage 
Act (including the amendment to introduce the definition of 
“marriage” made by the Marriage Amendment Act 2004) is a valid 
enactment of the Commonwealth Parliament, there is a question of 
invalidity whenever a state act purports to enter the legislative fields 
of marriage and the definition of marriage.110 
In a unanimous decision concerning section 109, Telstra v 
Worthing,111 the High Court elucidated the tests for invalidity under 
the section: 
The applicable principles are well settled. Cases still arise where 
one law requires what the other forbids. It was held in Wallis v 
Downard-Pickford (North Queensland) Pty Ltd that a State law which 
incorporated into certain contracts a term which a law of the 
Commonwealth forbad was invalid. However, it is clearly 
established that there may be inconsistency within the meaning of s 
 
 107. That is, it is impossible to obey both laws, such as where one law requires or permits 
what the other prohibits. Examples are discussed in GABRIEL MOENS & JOHN TRONE, LUMB AND 
MOENS’ THE CONSTITUTION OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA ANNOTATED 360–362 (2007) 
and include R v Brisbane Licensing Court ex parte Daniell (1920) 28 CLR 23; Telstra Corp Ltd v 
Worthing (1999) 197 CLR 61; Clyde Engineering v Cowburn (1926) 37 CLR 466; Viskauskas v 
Niland (1983) 153 CLR 280; Dao v Australian Postal Commission (1987) 162 CLR 317. 
 108. The Commonwealth statute may evince such an intention either by express words or 
by necessary implication. The intention to legislate exhaustively in a particular legislative field to 
the exclusion of any State legislation will, if found, produce an indirect inconsistency, referred to 
as “covering the field”. Examples are discussed in GABRIEL MOENS & JOHN TRONE, LUMB AND 
MOENS’ THE CONSTITUTION OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA ANNOTATED 360–362 (2007) 
and include Ex Parte McLean (1930) 43 CLR 472; Stock Motor Ploughs Ltd v Forsyth (1932) 48 
CLR 128; Commercial Radio Coffs Harbour Ltd v Fuller (1986) 161 CLR 47; The Queen v L (1991) 
174 CLR 379. 
 109. Bayside Council v Telstra Corp. (2004) 216 CLR 595, 628. 
 110. Attorney-General (Vic) v Commonwealth (1962) 107 CLR 519. 
 111. (1999) 197 CLR 61. 
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109 although it is possible to obey both the Commonwealth law 
and the State law. . . . 
In Victoria v The Commonwealth, Dixon J stated two propositions 
which are presently material. The first was: 
“When a State law, if valid, would alter, impair or detract from the 
operation of a law of the Commonwealth Parliament, then to that 
extent it is invalid.” 
The second, which followed immediately in the same passage, was: 
“Moreover, if it appears from the terms, the nature or the subject 
matter of a Federal enactment that it was intended as a complete 
statement of the law governing a particular matter or set of rights 
and duties, then for a State law to regulate or apply to the same 
matter or relation is regarded as a detraction from the full operation 
of the Commonwealth law and so as inconsistent.” 
The second proposition may apply in a given case where the first 
does not, yet, . . . if the first proposition applies, then s 109 of the 
Constitution operates even if, and without the occasion to consider 
whether, the second proposition applies.112 
Thus, the test as to whether there is a direct inconsistency 
between the Marriage Act and the Bill if it had been enacted is 
whether the Bill would “alter, impair or detract” from the operation 
of the Marriage Act. There is a strong argument that it would detract 
from the creation of a single legislative code created to deal with the 
legislative topic of “marriage.” The Marriage Act created a single 
regime for marriage in Australia. With respect to legal relations 
between same-sex couples, the express effect of the definition of 
“marriage” contained in the Act is that such relationships are not 
within the definition of “marriage.” Moreover, the Act would appear 
to fortify that definition by forbidding recognition of foreign 
marriages between same-sex couples in Australia. The Bill sought to 
alter that regime. It also sought to disrupt the universal operation of 
the federal Act throughout Australia as a code in relation to 
“marriage.” By creating an exceptional enclave, it would have 
impaired and detracted from the Marriage Act. The Bill sought to 
provide recognition for state “marriages” that, with respect to 
foreign “marriages” are forbidden by section 88EA. This supports a  
 
 
 112. Id. at 76–77. 
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view that the Bill, if passed into law, would have been found to be 
inconsistent with the Marriage Act.113 
It may be argued that the saving of certain state laws in relation 
to the registration of marriages in section 6 of the Marriage Act 
detracts from the argument that the Marriage Act “covers the field.” 
However, section 6 closely circumscribes the field in which a state 
law may operate—that is, only in relation to the registration of 
marriages as opposed to their solemnization. Indeed the provision 
strengthens the “covering the field” argument as it strongly implies, 
by the absence of an express preservation in respect to 
solemnization, that any state powers for creating a new and 
alternative regime for solemnization of “marriage” are not preserved. 
If the argument for saving state laws had any weight, one would 
expect there to be express saving provisions in the Marriage Act 
itself. As an example of legislation that contains state law saving 
provisions, a clear intention is expressed in both the Trade Practices 
Act 1974 (Cth) (TPA) and its successor, the Competition and Consumer 
Act 2010 (Cth) that state laws in relation to certain specified matters 
have continued valid operation. One of those was cited by the High 
Court in Master Education Services v Ketchell where the Court made 
reference to section 51AEA of the TPA: 
Section 51AEA states: 
“It is the Parliament’s intention that a law of a State or Territory 
should be able to operate concurrently with this Part unless the law 
is directly inconsistent with this Part.” 
The legislative purpose apparent in s 51AEA is to deny any 
intention to “cover the field” in the sense of the authorities 
concerning s 109 of the Constitution.114 
It has been argued that because section 88EA expressly 
repudiates foreign same-sex “marriages,” but does not expressly 
 
 113. This is consistent with the opinion published in 2006 by Professor Geoffrey Lindell in 
relation to a similar Bill previously before the parliament in Tasmania. Geoffrey Lindell, State 
Legislative Power to Enact Same-Sex Marriage Legislation, and the Effect of the Marriage Act 1961 
(Cth) as Amended by the Marriage Amendment Act 2004 (Cth), 9 CONST. L. & POL’Y REV. 25 (2006). 
He was of the view there was a direct inconsistency between the 2005 Bill and the Marriage Act. 
Id. at 26–28. 
 114. (2008) 236 CLR 101, 108. See also section 75(1) of the TPA which also preserves the 
state legislative capacity to regulate conduct in relation to consumer market transactions. Trade 
Practices Act 1974 (Cth) s 75(1). 
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repudiate domestic same-sex marriages, the Marriage Act leaves room 
for state same-sex marriage legislation.115 But there was good reason 
for the Marriage Act not to mention domestic same-sex marriages. 
First, the Marriage Act, as amended, provides national definition of 
marriage as being a union between a man and a woman for life.116 
What reason was there for dealing with the possibility of domestic 
same-sex marriages117 when they had been expressly excluded in 
domestic law by the insertion of the definition? 118 
If the Bill were to recognize internationally contracted same-sex 
“marriages,” that recognition would run directly contrary to the 
provisions of section 88EA. If it did not, it would begin the very 
fragmentation of the concept of marriage that the Marriage Act seeks 
to avoid by creating at least three diverse species of legal marriage: 
marriage under the federal Act, defined as between a man and a 
woman and recognized in all states and territories and 
internationally; a form of same-sex marriage, recognized only in 
Tasmania; and internationally contracted same-sex marriages, not 
recognized in Tasmania, but in all respects appearing the same as 
those contracted in Tasmania. The validity of any “same-sex 
marriage” would invite inquiry as to the place it was contracted—an  
inquiry the Commonwealth Act currently precludes. The intention of 
the federal Act is that there be only one legally recognized form of 
marriage in Australia. 
Professor George Williams, in an opinion in relation to the 2005 
Tasmanian Bill, has expressed the view that the proposed state law 
would not have been rendered inoperative by the Marriage Act 
because they would operate in separate fields.119 Central to 
Professor Williams’s argument is that the Marriage Act, after the 
2004 amendments, deals with “different type[s] of union[s]” leaving 
the way clear for the states to legislate in relation to same-sex 
marriage.120 With respect, the fatal and obvious flaw in this 
 
 115. George Williams, Advice regarding the proposed Same-Sex Marriage, 9 CONST. L. & POL’Y 
REV. 21 (2006). 
 116. Marriage Amendment Act 2004 (Cth) s 5(1). 
 117. See Cth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 27 May 2004, 29356 
(Philip Ruddock, Minster for Immigration), available at 
http://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Hansard. 
 118. Lindell, supra note 113, at 31. 
 119. Williams, supra note 115, at 24. 
 120. Id. at 23. 
DO NOT DELETE 1/29/2014 10:01 AM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2013 
550 
argument is that it is contrary to the express terms of the Marriage 
Act. The Marriage Act does not purport to deal with “different sex 
marriage” at all. At the time of passage, there was no such legal 
institution in Australia. The adjectival phrase “different sex” begs 
the question of the possibility of “same sex” marriage, when it is 
clear that the intention has been to exclude such an institution from 
Australia.121 The phrase “different sex marriage” is tautological. In 
2004, there was (and continues to be) only one legal institution 
described as “marriage” in Australia. The amended Marriage Act 
defines “marriage” as a union between a man and a woman for 
life.122 It deals with and establishes a complete statement of law in 
relation to marriage. Any union that is outside the terms of the 
Marriage Act is therefore not “marriage.”123 
To speak of “heterosexual” marriage in Australia is a legal 
tautology. It is a construct that is capable of providing neither logical 
legal space nor foundation for the concept of any other type of 
marriage—be it homosexual, trans-sexual, bigamous, polyandrous, 
polygynous, or otherwise.124 
C. Inconsistency with Respect to Maintenance and Property 
The presence in the Bill of Parts 4 and 5, which dealt with the 
incidents of separation, divorce, and property disputes, created a 
further potential inconsistency between Commonwealth and state 
law. 
By the Commonwealth Powers (De Facto Relationships) Act 2006 
(Tas), Tasmania referred powers to the Commonwealth in relation 
to financial matters between de facto partners. The definition of a de 
 
 121. Id. 
 122. Marriage Act 1961 (Cth) s 5(1). 
 123. And the Commonwealth legislation was passed in the knowledge that forms of de 
facto union were the subject of legal recognition in the respective states, including same-sex 
relationships. 
 124. When testifying before the House of Representatives Standing Committee on Social 
Policy and Legal Affairs concerning two same-sex marriage laws, Professor Williams did not 
assert that his opinion was definitive in relation to state laws on same-sex marriage. Instead, he 
said that there was “no clear answer” to this issue. Cth, Parliamentary Debates, House of 
Representatives Standing Committee on Social Policy and Legal Affairs, 16 April, 2012 (George 
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facto relationship in that Act was “a marriage-like relationship 
between two persons.”125 
In Graham v Paterson, Chief Justice Latham said: 
[T]he reference of matters under s. 51(xxxvii) does not deprive the 
State Parliament of any power. It results in the creation of an 
additional power in the Commonwealth Parliament. If the 
Commonwealth Parliament exercises such a power, s. 109 of the 
Constitution may become applicable, with the result that if a law of 
the State with respect to a matter referred was inconsistent with a 
law of the Commonwealth, the Commonwealth law would prevail 
and the State law to the extent of the inconsistency would be 
invalid. But unless the Commonwealth Parliament exercises the 
power to legislate with respect to the matter referred, no effect 
whatever is produced in relation to the operation of State laws.126 
The Commonwealth Parliament has now exercised the very 
powers referred to it by the States, including Tasmania, in enacting 
the Family Law Amendment (De Facto Matters and Other Measures) Act 
2008.127 That Act provides that all matters in relation to de facto 
financial matters will be dealt with by the Family Court, which 
includes all ‘marriage-like’ unions.128 The Bill purported to set up a 
different regime without withdrawing the referred power. While 
clause 47 attempts to accommodate Family Court proceedings by 
providing that proceedings in the Supreme Court will be adjourned if 
there are concurrent proceedings in the Family Court, it entered into 
the field covered by the Commonwealth Act and, so, would likely be 
inconsistent and inoperative under section 109. 
D. Conclusion on the State Capacity to Pass Same-Sex Marriage Laws 
As observed previously, the outcome of constitutional litigation 
is notoriously difficult to predict. However, it would seem that 
section 109 and the Marriage Act most likely constitute insuperable 
barriers to state legislation on the subject of same-sex marriage 
while the Marriage Act remains in its current form. 
 
 125. Commonwealth Powers (De Facto Relationships) Act 2006 (Tas) s 3(1). 
 126. Graham v Paterson (1950) 81 CLR 1, 19–20. 
 127. Family Law Amendment (De Facto Matters and Other Measures) Act 2008 (Cth). 
 128. Id. 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
Opponents of legislation permitting same-sex marriage in 
Australia have presented several species of argument to avoid an 
intolerable result. Opponents argue that an institution, central to the 
meaning of the community as they perceive it would have been 
irreversibly changed. Freedoms to speak and act upon beliefs in 
relation to marriage, as we currently know it, would have been 
forever lost or, at least, compromised. 
They presented passionate arguments as to why the legislation 
should not be passed. But of all of the arguments presented, it was 
the constitutional arguments—reasons why the legislation could not 
be validly passed—that gave the opponents of the legislation a voice 
that could be heard, understood, and used to persuade. 
Although Australia has no bill of rights guaranteeing any of the 
freedoms that might have been encroached by passage of same-sex 
marriage legislation, it does have a robust set of constitutional 
arrangements with courts to enforce them, the combination of which 
provides a brake upon exercises of legislative and executive power. 
This is not a counsel of complacency. The protections could and 
should be stronger. But by a strange serendipity, those who opposed 
strengthening of the rights are the beneficiaries, on this occasion, of 
the protections that are in place. 
In one of his recent novels, 1Q84, Haruki Murakami describes 
two parallel universes that existed in 1984.129 The first is the 1984 
of history as we know it—the true 1984 of our world. The second is 
a world that in many respects closely resembles 1984, but on closer 
inspection has some strange differences. It is 1Q84—an Orwellian 
dystopia, illuminated at night by two moons. In the parallel universe 
that is 1Q84, characters apparently familiar to the protagonists from 
1984 behave in strange, intimidating ways. What separates 1984 
from 1Q84 is a mesh fence with a gap just large enough for the 
protagonists to pass through. 
In a sense, the only separation that Australia might have from 




 129. HARUKI MURAKAMI, 1Q84 (2009). 
